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Abstract
Children’s understanding of properties of the earth was investigated by 
interviewing Asian and white British classmates aged 4 - 8 years (N = 167). Two 
issues were explored: whether they held mental models of the earth (Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1992) or instead had fragmented knowledge (di Sessa, 1988); and the 
influence of the children’s different cultural backgrounds. Children selected from a set 
of plastic models and answered forced choice questions. Using this methodology, 
there were no significant differences in the overall performance of Asian and white 
children after language skills were partialled out. Even young children showed an 
emerging knowledge of some properties of the earth, but the distributions of their 
combinations of responses provided no evidence that they had mental models. Instead, 
these distributions closely resembled those that would be expected if children’s 
knowledge in this domain were fragmented. Possible reasons for the differences 
between these findings and those of previous research are discussed.
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Children’s understanding of the earth in a multicultural community
Mental models or fragments of knowledge?
Acquiring an understanding of the earth’s properties cannot be accomplished 
solely through a process of direct observation and individual construction. 
Appearances, such as the world’s apparent flatness, can be deceptive; and facts, such 
as the possibility of living in the Southern Hemisphere without falling off, are 
counterintuitive. To a large extent, then, knowledge in this field must be transmitted 
through lessons and explanations from adults, and exposure to cultural resources such 
as pictures, books, stories and audio-visual media. 
The process of acquisition of this knowledge is gradual. Young children 
frequently claim, for example, that it is possible to fall off the edge of the flat earth, 
and that the sky is ‘on top’ of the earth. Previous research has suggested that it is only 
by late childhood or adolescence that most individuals come to share the scientific 
view of a spherical, unsupported earth with objects falling towards its centre (e.g., 
Nussbaum & Novack, 1976; Sneider & Pulos, 1983; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). The 
development of this understanding can reveal much about how scientific concepts are 
adopted and how conceptual change is brought about. 
One view is that, before individuals adopt the scientifically accepted concepts, 
they have intuitions, presuppositions or naive theories that guide or constrain the 
acquisition of knowledge. If this is the case, it follows that the role of cultural 
transmission of scientific knowledge is relatively slight during the initial stages of 
acquisition. Instead, direct observations of the world are likely to be more significant 
until cultural information gradually begins to be synthesized into existing naive 
theoretical constructs. The educational implication of this approach is that, since 
children's naive preconceptions will tend to hinder their acquisition of scientific 
Understanding the earth    4
4
concepts, it may be necessary to help children to restructure their knowledge rather 
than simply to provide information for assimilation (Diakidoy & Kendeou, 2001).
This view is espoused by Vosniadou and her colleagues (e.g., Diakidoy, 
Vosniadou & Hawks, 1997; Samarapungavan, Vosniadou & Brewer, 1996; 
Vosniadou, 1994, 1996; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, 1994) in their work on children's 
understanding of the earth. They argue that young children's thinking is strongly 
influenced by observations of the local environment, for example, that landscapes are 
generally flat and objects need support. The young child is said to have a framework 
theory, or intuitive physics, that is based on these presuppositions.
According to this view, children have mental models of the earth. That is, even 
young children have ‘theories’ which are internally consistent representations. At first, 
they hold ‘initial’ models that are based on their framework theory and involve robust, 
‘entrenched’ beliefs that the earth is flat and supported. As children are increasingly 
exposed to cultural information that is assimilated through the framework theory, 
these initial models gradually succumb to more sophisticated hybrid, or ‘synthetic’, 
mental models. For example, Vosniadou and her colleagues claim that some children 
reconcile the information that the earth is spherical with their entrenched beliefs that 
the world is flat by forming a ‘dual earth’ model. This consists of a round earth in the 
sky, and a flat earth on which people live. By late childhood, most children relinquish 
synthetic models and adopt the culturally-received scientific one. 
Based on the premise that all children, whatever their culture, share the same 
experiences of flatness and the need for support, Vosniadou and her colleagues have 
proposed that young children’s framework physics is universal and, hence, that initial 
models all share the same deep structure. By interviewing children of various ages and 
cultures, and comparing their drawings, they claim to have shown that the 
developmental sequence of mental models, from intuitive through synthetic to 
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scientific, is indeed universal. Though there were specific cultural influences, a 
number of similarities were found in the cosmologies of young children in various 
cultures, including Samoan (Brewer, Hendrich & Vosniadou, 1987), Greek 
(Vosniadou & Brewer, 1990), Native American (Diakidoy et al, 1997), and Indian 
(Samarapungavan et al, 1996). 
An alternative view is that young children's concepts lack theoretical structure or 
coherence, and are not constrained by presuppositions or intuitions. Instead, until 
children have acquired a scientific model, they are 'theory neutral'. The development 
of understanding of the earth, for example, involves the gradual accumulation of 
fragments of cultural information that may be wholly inconsistent with one another. 
According to this view of development, children have no mental models prior to 
gaining understanding of the prevailing cultural theory. Children are, from an early 
age, the recipients and holders of cultural information that, at least until they 
understand the scientific theory, remains unsystematic and fragmented. As di Sessa 
(1988, p. 52) has argued, “intuitive physics consists of a rather large number of 
fragments rather than one or even any small number of integrated structures one might 
call ‘theories’.”
In an investigation by Butterworth et al (2001), evidence was obtained that tends 
to support the latter position. Using plastic models and a forced choice procedure, they 
have shown that even 4- and 5 year-olds in Australia frequently demonstrate aspects 
of scientific understanding of non-intuitable cultural information. Moreover, they 
found little evidence for initial or synthetic mental models. They report that most 
children who did not yet have the scientific model showed considerable inconsistency 
and lack of co-ordination in their responses to questions. Moreover, Schoultz, Säljö 
and Wyndhamn (2001) found that, by providing children with a globe, even first grade 
Swedish children demonstrated sophisticated knowledge of the shape and properties 
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of the earth. Again, no evidence of intuitive mental models or constraints was found. 
Such findings challenge the contention that even young children have systematic and 
internally consistent mental models of the earth.
Methodological issues
Why, then, do Vosniadou and her colleagues appear to have found a number of 
internally consistent models among their interviewees, while Butterworth and 
Schoultz and their colleagues have not? One possibility is that the reason lies with the 
different methods used by researchers. Vosniadou and colleagues (e.g., Vosniadiou & 
Brewer, 1992, 1994; Diakidoy et al, 1997) have employed children’s drawings to 
inform the researchers’ interpretations of what children think. Children’s drawings of 
the earth are, indeed, strikingly different from adults’, and a number of recurring, 
intriguing forms – such as the dual earth - demand explanation. But the explanation 
need not necessarily lie in mental models. 
Butterworth et al (2001) have pointed out that the use of drawings might lead to 
misrepresentation of children’s understanding. Since children are poor at drawing 3-
dimensional objects and have difficulty combining perspectives (Blades & Spencer, 
1994; Ingram & Butterworth, 1989; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), they might elect, for 
example, to draw a flat or dual earth despite knowing it to be spherical and unitary. 
The internal consistency of a drawing could, then, be an artefact of the 2-dimensional 
medium rather than a representation of the child’s mental reality. 
Support for the contention that model selection and drawing may produce 
qualitatively different responses in this domain has been found in research designed to 
test the appropriateness of asking children to draw their views of the earth (Martin, 
Moore, Clifford & Nobes, 2001). Children drew pictures of the earth and, either two 
weeks before or two weeks later, selected and answered questions about plastic 
objects that represented the mental models of the earth that, according to Vosniadou 
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and Brewer (1992), are the most prevalent. The children’s drawings closely resembled 
those produced by Vosniadou and Brewer’s respondents, yet for most children there 
was little or no relation between their drawings and their choice of models. Many 
whose drawings appeared to indicate initial or synthetic mental models chose a sphere 
and showed no evidence that the constraints postulated by Vosniadou and Brewer 
were operating on their model selection. 
However, the medium (drawing vs. model) is unlikely to be the sole 
explanation. Samarapungavan et al (1996) used clay modelling and model selection 
“in response to problems with the classification of children’s two-dimensional 
drawings of the earth’s shape in the earlier Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) study.” (p. 
514). They report that children still showed evidence of holding mental models such 
as the sphere, hollow sphere and flat disc, although not of dual earth models.
A second possible reason for the differences between researchers’ findings 
concerns how mental models are identified. Vosniadou and her colleagues' approach 
has been to conduct an inductive search by asking a series of questions about the 
shape of the earth, transcribing the responses, and then trying “to see if we could find 
evidence in the data for the consistent use of a small number of well defined mental 
models of the earth.” (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, p.547). To work out the criteria by 
which to assign children to mental models, Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) first made 
“A careful examination of our data, together with the findings of prior research in this 
area” (pp. 548 – 549). They then referred back to their data because “it became 
apparent that a number of modifications of the pattern of responses were needed... 
Analysis of the data also suggested a re-examination of the patterns of expected 
responses for both the dual earth model and the hollow sphere model” (p. 554). 
Mental models are, then, largely derived from the very data they are used to classify.
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There is a danger with this circular approach that consistency will be 
‘discovered’ because evidence of inconsistency is ignored. To illustrate this point, 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) asked children where people live, and to draw the sky. 
It would be predicted that children with consistent scientific mental models would say 
that people and the sky are all around the earth. Yet Vosniadou and Brewer classified 
children as having scientific mental models regardless of whether they drew people 
around or inside the earth, and the sky as a line around or above it. Furthermore, 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) found it necessary to allow one ‘acceptable deviation’ 
to be discounted per child. An acceptable deviation was defined as a statement being 
“in principle inconsistent with the mental model in question” (p. 554). For example, 
children were classified as having spherical mental models despite saying that we look 
up to see the earth. Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) were able to disregard problematic 
responses and tolerate deviations because, on finding these apparent inconsistencies, 
they modified the mental models to allow for them. In these ways, inconsistent 
responses were rendered consistent. While Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) provide 
possible justifications for their modifications (e.g., “drawings depicting the sky with a 
horizontal line located above the top of the circle... could represent conventional ways 
of drawing the sky”, (pp. 555-556)), the alternative explanation – that these are true 
inconsistencies resulting from children’s fragmented knowledge of the earth – can by 
no means be discounted.
Another reason to suspect that Vosniadou and Brewer’s (1992) method of 
analysis tends to increase apparent consistency is that there was considerable overlap 
between some of their questions. For example, they asked both ‘show me where the 
people live’, and ‘show me where Champain [the children’s home town] is’. These 
questions are likely to have consistent answers because children will tend to position a 
town where they have previously said that people live. Similarly, children were asked 
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both ‘is there an edge to the earth?’ and ‘can you fall off the edge?”: a child who has 
said there is no edge is very unlikely to say that you can fall off it.
Finally, a degree of consistency is to be expected because children who are 
correct on one question (perhaps because they are older, better informed or more 
intelligent) are likely to be correct on others, and vice versa. These points might 
explain Vosniadou and Brewer’s (1992) finding that, when they compared random 
allocations of individual responses with actual combinations of responses, the 
distributions were statistically different. 
To date, then, Vosniadou and Brewer’s (1992, 1994) approach has characterised 
mental models inductively on the basis of collected data. A required second stage 
involves deductive methods, where the definitions and criteria by which mental 
models are classified are determined before testing, and are validated empirically. This 
is one of the aims of the current paper. 
Cultural sources of knowledge
The influence of culture is evident in Vosniadou and colleagues’ findings. While 
they claim that the structure of initial models is universally restrained by flatness and 
the need for support, they report considerable cultural differences in the content of 
children’s models. For example, it appears that some Indian children believe that the 
earth is a dish that floats on water (Samarapungavan et al, 1996); Samoan children 
describe a ‘Ring’ universe, reflecting an important symbol in that culture (Vosniadou, 
1994); and native American children use psychological causality to explain the 
movement of the sun and moon in the day-night cycle (Diakidoy et al, 1997). These 
beliefs reflect each culture’s mythology, suggesting that information is transmitted 
through, for example, conversations, stories and pictures. 
Butterworth et al (2001) compared the responses of Australian children with 
those of children in England. They found that, although there was no significant
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difference in their spatial reasoning, young Australian children understood the shape 
of the earth earlier than did their English counterparts. These researchers suggest a 
number of possible reasons for the different rates of knowledge acquisition by their 
Australian and British respondents. Australia is a large landmass saliently located in 
the Southern Hemisphere whose inhabitants often have close cultural links with 
people living in the Northern Hemisphere. It therefore seems likely that Australian 
children might be exposed to discussions and stories about other countries that would 
provide information about, for example, the sphericity of earth. Other possible reasons 
include differences between school systems or the mass media in the two countries.
This paper focuses on the opportunity afforded by London’s large Asian school 
population to look at a number of these issues. Asian children growing up in London 
have strong links with another continent because almost all have parents or 
grandparents who were born in Asia and have close family there. Moreover, they are 
culturally and linguistically different from the majority culture, and therefore likely to 
have increased awareness of their families’ origins. These factors might be expected 
to increase exposure to geographical information and, relative to their classmates who 
lack such international contacts, enhance children’s understanding of, for example, the 
shape of the world. 
The cultural diversity of East London offers a natural experiment in the role of 
culture in cognitive development. The present study compared for the first time the 
knowledge of the earth of children of different cultures – Gujarati and white [1] -
growing up in the same area, and attending the same schools and classes. In this way, 
the possible impact of differential schooling, that may account for previous findings of 
cross-cultural differences, was controlled. 
Unlike most of their white classmates, Gujarati children in London have close 
family ties with another continent. Many have spoken by telephone to, or even visited, 
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their Indian relatives. The view that these family connections are key influences in 
children’s understanding of the earth would be supported if Gujarati children were 
found to have superior levels of understanding of the earth compared to white 
children.
A potentially confounding factor in cultural comparisons is that of language. 
Especially during the early years, Gujarati children attending schools in London tend 
to have rather poorer spoken English than their white classmates as a result of their 
usually speaking Gujarati at home. Thus their performance in interviews might be 
affected because their poorer English hinders their acquisition of information, 
comprehension of interviewers’ questions, or expression of views. 
In this study children of three age groups were tested in order to compare the 
mental model account of knowledge acquisition (Vosniadou & Brewer 1992, 1994) 
with that of fragmentation accounts (e.g., di Sessa, 1988). Classmates with very 
different cultural and linguistic backgrounds – Gujarati and white British - were 
included to investigate whether, with language controlled for, any differences between 
children’s understanding of the earth might arise from factors such as family 
connections and cultural mythologies. 
We hypothesized that children’s responses would reveal evidence for 
fragmented knowledge rather than mental models, as indexed by inconsistency rather 
than consistency. The prediction for the relative performance of white and Gujarati 
children was left open as Gujarati children could be expected to have had greater 
exposure to information about the earth’s properties than their white classmates, but 
might be hampered by their poorer English language skills. 
Method
Sample
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Participants were 167 children (82 Gujarati and 85 white) attending eight Infant 
and Primary schools in East London. The children were divided into three age groups: 
4-5 year-olds (M = 5.19 years, SD = 0.41); 6-7 year-olds (M = 7.03 years, SD = 0.48); 
and 8 year-olds (M = 8.28 years, SD = 0.26). In each group, there were approximately 
equal numbers of children of each gender and ethnicity.
The Gujarati children were all born in the UK and were bilingual. The majority 
of their families emigrated from Gujarat, a state in western India, during the 1960s and 
1970s. Typically, these children spoke Gujarati at home (because some older members 
of the family lacked English), but English at school. The schools were all 
multicultural English-medium state schools.
Apparatus
Three green plastic models, each about 15cm in diameter, were presented to the 
children. Each represented one of the most common mental models proposed by 
Vosniadou & Brewer (1992): the sphere; flat-topped sphere; and disc corresponding to 
scientific, hollow earth and flat earth mental models respectively. The dual earth 
mental model could be represented by use of both the sphere and disc. A hollow, 
transparent globe, consisting of separable halves and measuring 17.5cm in diameter, 
could be used to represent the sky, either as a sphere or hemisphere.
Measures
Children's responses to the following four questions are presented here. These 
questions are based on those used by Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) about the 
properties of the earth, and concern the key concepts of shape, gravity and support.
Each question was phrased to force a choice between a counterintuitive, correct 
response, or an intuitive, incorrect response. 
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1. “Look at these models. Here is a round ball, here is a part of a ball with a flat 
top, here is a flat surface. Can you point to the model that shows how you think the 
world really is?”
2. “If you walked for many days in a straight line, would you fall off the edge of 
the world?” [2]
3. “Can people live up there, down there (all over the world)?”
4. “Some children think the sky is all around; other children think the sky is only 
on top. Show me, using the model of the world you have chosen, where the sky really 
is.”
A Gujarati interviewer was involved in piloting the interview instrument, both 
in English and Gujarati, to ensure that the instructions and questions were 
comprehensible to Gujarati children in either language.
The long form of the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) was used to 
assess children's verbal vocabulary comprehension age for standard English (Dunn & 
Dunn, 1982). 
Procedure
The children were interviewed individually at school for 20-25 minutes. They 
were introduced to the interview by being told that we were interested in what 
children of their age thought about the world; that the interview was not a test; that 
no-one apart from the researchers - including their teachers - would know what they 
said; and that they could say that they didn't know, not answer, or terminate the 
interview, if they wanted.
The participants were first assessed using the BPVS and then given a 15-item 
interview of fixed order that began with the questions about the shape and properties 
of the earth that are reported here. The interview went on to consider the day / night 
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cycle and perspective taking (see Butterworth et al., 2001, for a description and 
discussion of this instrument).
If, in the interviewer’s opinion, a child did not understand the question, the 
interviewer would repeat and, if necessary, reformulate it [3]. Children were not asked 
to explain or justify their responses (an approach that we have since explored in 
Martin, Clifford, Moore & Nobes, 2001).
Props were hidden from the children until they were required. The participants 
were then shown all three models and asked the first question. Children could use 
more than one model if they desired. The other models were then moved out of sight, 
and, for the remainder of the interview, each child was asked the questions with 
reference to his or her chosen model(s). The interviewers did not point to, nor touch, 
any part of the models except to hold them up for the child.
The Gujarati children were interviewed by the Gujarati researcher. While they 
were invited to be interviewed in Gujarati, all but one chose to use English. Initial 
coding took place during the interview, and all interviews were audio recorded to 
allow later inter-rater reliability checks. The three fieldworkers had some knowledge 
of previous work in this area, but were not aware of the specific research hypotheses.
Results
The responses of the three age groups of Gujarati and white children to four 
questions about the shape of the earth are presented here. In the first stage of the
analysis, responses to each question were examined to determine any links between 
performance and age, ethnicity and language, and the relative influence of these 
factors on children’s responses. In the second stage of analysis, associations between 
responses to questions were investigated to assess whether they were best predicted by 
a mental models or fragmentation account of knowledge. 
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The relative influences of age, ethnicity and language skills
Table 1 shows the proportion of correct responses by the Gujarati and white 
children. In response to question 1, most children chose the spherical model of the 
earth: Even at age 4–5 years, a significant majority of children chose this model (χ2(1) 
= 6.63, p = .01). The proportion who did so increased with age: The 6-7 year olds 
(χ2(1) = 12.95, p < .001) and 8 year olds (χ2(1) = 22.87, p < .001) were significantly 
more likely to choose the sphere than the 4-5 year olds. There was no significant 
difference between Gujarati and white children overall (χ2(1) = 0.10) or at any of the 
specific age levels.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Within all age groups significant majorities of white children said in response to 
question 2 that you can’t fall off the earth (χ2 (1) = 8.96, p <.01; χ2 (1) = 15.50, p < 
.001; χ2 (1) = 24.89, p <.001). The improvement with age was not significant (χ2 (2) = 
1.20, p= 0.55). Gujarati children did not perform significantly better than chance on 
this question, except at age 4-5 years (χ2 (1) = 4.26, p <.04). The white children 
performed significantly better than the Gujaratis at age 6-7 (χ2(1) = 4.69, p = .03), at 
age 8 (χ2(1) = 4.47, p = .03), and overall (χ2(1) = 7.58, p = .006).
Responses to the third question, whether people can live all over the world, 
showed a strong developmental progression. The performance of both ethnicities at 
age 4-5 years was at chance level, but by age 6-7 highly significant proportions of both
white (χ2 (1) = 8.34, p <.005) and Gujarati (χ2 (1) = 8.34, p <.005) children were 
correct. At age 8, all but one white child and five Gujarati children answered correctly. 
There were no significant differences between ethnicities overall (χ2(1) = .29, p = 
.59), or at any age.
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Similar improvements with age occurred with responses to the fourth question. 
A majority of younger children said the sky was only on top (Gujaratis: χ2 (1) = 3.63, 
p = .06; whites: χ2 (1) = 12.0, p <.001). By age 6-7, the proportion of Gujaratis who 
gave correct answers had increased to chance, and whites to significant levels (χ2 (1) =
4.92, p = .03), and by age 8 most children of each ethnicity were correct (Gujaratis: χ2
(1) = 3.38, p = .07; whites: χ2 (1) = 8.34, p <.01). Any differences between ethnicities 
at any age group, or across all three age groups, did not approach significance (overall 
χ2(1) = 1.20, p = .27).
Table 2 shows the mean number of correct responses to the four questions made 
by children of the three age-groups and two ethnicities. A 2 (ethnic groups) x 3 (ages) 
analysis of variance revealed that the white children gave significantly more correct 
responses than the Gujarati children (F(1,161) = 6.34, p = .01). However, this 
difference was due almost entirely to the Gujaratis’ relatively poor performance on the 
second question (fall off the edge of the world). When the mean number of correct 
responses to the other three questions were compared, there was no significant 
difference between the ethnicities (mean scores out of possible 3 correct: Gujarati = 
2.02, white = 2.14, F(1,163) = .85, p = .36). 
There was a significant difference across the age groups in the mean number of 
target questions answered correctly (F(2,161) = 20.84, p<0.001). Tukey tests (with a 
0.05 significance level) showed that 8 year-olds gave significantly more correct 
answers than the 6-7 year olds, who in turn responded correctly significantly more 
than 4-5 year-olds. There was no significant interaction between age and ethnicity.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
A second ANOVA was carried out on the children’s BVPS scores. As would be 
expected, there was a significant improvement in children’s vocabulary 
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comprehension with age (F(2,161)  = 65.07, p < 0.001), and the white children 
performed significantly better than their Gujarati classmates (F(1,161) = 71.56, p < 
0.001). There was, however, a significant interaction between ethnicity and age group 
(F(2,161)  = 4.70, p = 0.01). While the white children scored higher on the BPVS than 
the Gujarati children in each age group, post-hoc Tukey tests (p < .05) revealed these 
differences to be significant only at the 6-7 and 8 year levels. Within ethnicities, each 
older age-group scored higher than younger age-groups, differences that were 
significant, however, only between white 6-7 and 8 year-olds. 
To assess whether language differences between ethnicities explained the 
difference in their performance, logistic regressions (backwards LR) were run in 
which age, ethnicity and language were the independent variables and performance on 
each of the four questions was the dependent variable for each separate regression 
(Table 3).
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
These analyses indicated that, for all four questions, age was a significant factor 
in predicting performance. Also, vocabulary predicted responses for the first two 
questions (model selection and falling off the earth). Since vocabulary and age share a 
large amount of variance it is to be expected that in some instances one variable, but 
not the other, would fit into the model. For no question reported here did ethnicity 
seem to contribute to responses, over and above age and vocabulary. In all cases, 
however, the goodness of fit was modest (as indicated by the high values of the log 
likelihood coefficient).
The relative influence of language on children’s total number of correct answers 
to the four questions was also investigated by using vocabulary as a covariate in an 
ANCOVA. Following this analysis, there was no significant difference between the 
scores of the Gujarati and white children (F(1,160) = 0.05). The differences between 
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the three age groups were reduced to a nonsignificant trend (F(2,160) = 2.42, p = .09).
There was no significant interaction between age and ethnicity (F(2,160) = 0.36).
Mental models or unconnected fragments of knowledge?
If children have mental models of the earth, their knowledge within this domain 
should exhibit a degree of systematicity and consistency. There should, therefore, be 
strong associations between the answers given by children. For example, children with 
scientific mental models would be expected not only to choose the sphere but also to 
say that people can live all over the world. On the other hand, children with initial or 
synthetic mental models would be expected to choose a different model and to say that 
people can only live on top. There would, then, be an association between answers to 
these two questions, the nature of the association being predicated upon the 
respondents’ underlying mental models.
In contrast, a fragmentation account leads to the prediction that no strong 
associations between children’s responses would occur. For example, children who 
chose the sphere would be no more likely to say that people can live all over than 
would children who chose another model. 
In the second stage of analysis, these two contrasting accounts were tested by 
assessing the degree of association between children’s answers. It was necessary to 
compare children within age and cultural groups since it is likely that associations 
could occur because of these factors, rather than as a result of any mental models they 
might have. For example, younger children might be expected to be incorrect, and 
older children correct, on most questions. This would result in associations between 
answers, due to age. In Table 4 associations between all pairs of answers by children 
of different ages and ethnicities are presented.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
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In order to test whether the associations between responses reported in Table 4 
were due to age, ethnicity or language factors, the logistic regressions reported above 
were run again. This time responses that were associated with each target response 
were added in to each model as independent variables to see whether they would add 
significantly to the goodness of fit of each of the models reported. In no case did the 
associated variables add to the goodness of fit of the models, suggesting that age and 
vocabulary factors were mediating any response relationships between these variables.
The predictions of the two contrasting accounts (mental models vs. 
fragmentation) were also tested by considering each child’s combination of responses 
to all four questions. Three responses were possible to the first question (choose a 
model): sphere, flat-top or disc. These responses were coded 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
For each of the other three questions (would you fall off?; can you live all over?; 
where is the sky?) two responses were possible – correct, coded 1, or incorrect, coded 
2. For each child, then, there were 24 (3x2x2x2) possible ways of responding to the 
four questions. Each way of responding is termed a Response Combination (RC). In 
the Appendix each RC is defined and allocated a number. For example, a child who 
chose the sphere and said that you cannot fall off, cannot live all over, and the sky is 
only on top would have an RC of 1,1,2,2, which is RC number 4 (RC4).
Each child’s RC was determined and, for each group of children (according to 
ethnicity, age, or both) the observed distribution of children’s RCs to the four 
questions was mapped. 
If mental models are present they should be apparent in the observed 
distribution of RCs. That is, mental models would be indicated by particular RCs 
being given by children significantly more frequently than would be expected by 
chance. For example, children with flat earth mental models would be expected to 
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choose a disc and say that you can fall off the earth, cannot live all over and the sky is 
only on top. They would therefore have RC24. 
According to Vosniadou and her colleagues, there are approximately six 
common mental models to which more than 80% of children’s responses can be 
assigned (e.g., Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992; Diakidoy et al, 1997). The remaining 
children are described as being in transition, and their models are said to be ‘mixed’ or 
‘undetermined’. If this were the case, over 80% of children would be expected to give 
one of about 6 RCs, each corresponding to one of the common mental models, and 
fewer than 20% of children would give other RCs, each of which would correspond to 
mixed models. 
By contrast, if children’s knowledge were structured in such a way that there is 
no connection, or coherence, between fragments of knowledge, a very different 
distribution of RCs should occur. The probability of a child giving a certain answer to 
one of the questions would not be associated with how they responded to other 
questions [4]. Like tosses of a coin, each response would be independent. The chances 
of a particular RC occurring would equal the product of the probabilities of each 
answer being given. For example, if within a group of children the proportion of 
correct responses, and therefore the chances of being correct, on each of the four 
questions were .8, .5, .6 and .4 respectively, then the proportion of children expected 
to answer all four correctly, and therefore to have RC1, would be .8x.5x.6x.4 = .096. 
The distribution of RCs that would be expected if responses were not associated can 
be generated by calculating the probability of each RC in this way. This fragmented
distribution is the distribution that would be expected to occur if children’s knowledge
were fragmented because their responses would therefore lack any coherence.
The two contrasting accounts, mental models and fragmentation, lead to 
different predictions concerning the distribution of observed RCs. If Vosniadou and 
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her colleagues are correct, only a small number of RCs would be given by children, 
each corresponding to a mental model. If the fragmentation account is correct, the 
observed distributions should not differ significantly from the fragmented 
distributions. 
Each group of interviewees’ fragmented and observed distributions are likely to 
be different from those of other groups since their probabilities of responses differ: for 
example, higher proportions of 8 year-olds than of 4-5 year-olds will answer each 
question correctly. For this reason, separate pairs of observed and fragmented 
distributions are presented for each group. The observed and fragmented distributions 
of RCs for each age group are compared in Figures 1a-c, for each ethnic group in 
Figures 1d-e, and for all children in Figure 1f.
FIGURES 1a-f ABOUT HERE
It is clear that, for each group, there is close resemblance between the 
fragmented and observed distributions. Correlations between the two distributions, 
which range from moderately strong to very strong (and all highly significant), are 
given in Table 5 (last column). These findings indicate little or no consistency 
occurring in the children’s responses to the four questions. Correlations were lowest 
for the younger children, suggesting the possibility of some modest coherence within 
these children’s responses.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
To assess whether there were any discrepancies between the observed 
frequencies of RCs and the frequencies predicted from the fragmentation account, all 
24 observed and fragmented RC pairs were compared in each of the twelve age and / 
or ethnicity groupings of the children. None differed significantly. When all 167 
children were considered, the number who gave RC19 (n = 6) was found to be 
marginally significantly greater than that predicted on the fragmented distribution (n = 
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1.48). This combination involved children choosing the disc, saying you could fall off 
it, not live all over, and the sky is all around. 
The small numbers of children in some age / ethnicity groups (minimum = 24), 
and the relatively large number of possible RCs (24) are likely to have led to some 
attenuated correlations. On the other hand, these numbers may also have masked 
significant differences between fragmented and observed distributions. However, the 
extent of any such differences is unlikely to approach those predicted from the mental 
model theory. 
Some RCs occurred more commonly than others. A total of 138 of the 162 
children (85.19%) each gave one of the eight most commonly occurring RCs, a 
proportion that reduced to 124 of 162 (76.54%) when the six most common were 
considered. These proportions are almost identical to those predicted from the 
fragmented distribution (85.00% and 76.88%, respectively).
Of the 24 RCs, four correspond to mental models described by Vosniadou and 
Brewer (1992, pp.555-571). RC1 corresponds to their ‘spherical earth’ model, RC3 to 
the ‘flattened sphere’, RC12 the ‘hollow sphere’, and RC24 to the ‘disc / rectangular 
earth’. In addition, children could use both the sphere and the disc to represent the 
dual earth. The remaining RCs correspond to Vosniadou and Brewer’s mixed models. 
Of the 162 children, 58 (35.8%) gave RCs that corresponded to the mental models 
described by Vosniadou and Brewer (1992). The observed number of children with 
RCs that corresponded to mental models did not differ significantly from that 
predicted from the fragmented distribution (35.8% vs. 31.2%, χ2 (1) = 0.68). In 
contrast, Vosniadou and Brewer report that 49 of the 60 (81.7%) children who they 
interviewed gave one of these responses, a difference that is highly significant (81.7% 
vs. 31.2%, χ2 (1) = 36.9, p < .001). 
Understanding the earth    23
23
Most of the observed RCs that were consistent with mental models (44 / 58 = 
75.8%) were RC1, in which children were correct on all four questions. This 
proportion is slightly (but non-significantly) greater than that predicted from the 
fragmented distribution (75.8% vs. 68.7%, χ2 (1) = .71). 
There was no evidence for the flat-earth model, since only one of the children 
gave RC24. Neither was there support for the dual earth model, since no child chose 
to use both the sphere and the disc.
It is possible that the inconsistency between children’s responses occurs because 
one or more of our questions was misunderstood by children. For example, some 
children might have said that it is impossible to fall off the earth not because they 
knew it had no edge, but because they thought the edge was too far to walk to, or 
because there were mountains or oceans in the way. The consequence would be to 
create the impression of inconsistency. In order to test this possibility, fragmented and 
observed distributions were computed four more times, each with one of the four 
questions omitted. If a question were poor and so introduced inconsistency, we would 
expect its omission from the analysis to increase consistency, and therefore for the 
fragmented and observed distributions to diverge. As the central columns in Table 5 
show, no strong divergence was found: in each case, correlations between the two 
distributions remained at least moderately strong and significant. Again, the lowest 
correlations occurred with the youngest group of children.
Discussion
The rate of acquisition of knowledge in this domain is by no means uniform. For 
example, although almost all 6-7 year-olds knew that the earth is spherical, a large 
proportion of 8 year-olds did not know that the sky is all around the earth. Similarly, 
Gujarati children in East London seemed to make no improvement between 4 and 8 
Understanding the earth    24
24
years of age on the question about falling off the edge of the earth, whereas their white 
classmates did. While age is important, then, so too are other factors.
It was suggested that, owing to their presumed greater exposure to information 
about people on another continent, Gujarati children might perform better than their 
white classmates. This was not found to be the case. No differences were found 
between the groups’ responses, except that Gujaratis were significantly more likely to 
say that it is possible to fall off the edge of the world. This difference was accounted 
for by the Gujaratis’ relatively poor English language skills. Therefore, no evidence 
was found for the children’s performance on these questions being influenced by 
culture per se. Instead, the only difference between the cultural groups’ responses 
seems to have resulted from differences in verbal abilities. Good language 
comprehension is liable to enhance children's acquisition and communication of 
information in domains such as cosmology that are heavily constrained by the 
transmission of cultural knowledge. The finding that differences in comprehension 
were most closely associated with responses about falling off the earth suggests that 
children found this question most linguistically challenging.
According to Vosniadou and Brewer (1992, 1994), children have a framework 
theory based on intuitions of flatness and support that guide their responses to 
questions such as those asked in the present study. No evidence of such a theory or 
intuitions was found in the present study. Even 4-5 year-olds – at an earlier age than 
those generally tested by Vosniadou and her colleagues – tended to give the correct, 
counterintuitive answers by choosing the sphere to represent the earth rather than 
alternative flat models, and saying that you can’t fall off the earth. It appears that 
children's responses were either based on culturally transmitted scientific knowledge 
or were guesses because the children simply didn't know. 
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The findings of this study support the contention that the young child’s 
underlying knowledge structures of properties of the earth are fragmented (e.g., di 
Sessa, 1988), as opposed to being organised into coherent models (e.g., Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1992, 1994). Language skills and age accounted for the few associations that 
occurred between answers to pairs of questions. The distributions of combinations of 
responses to all four questions, and to each possible set of three questions, closely 
resembled the distributions that were predicted from the fragmentation account, and 
were very different from those that would occur if children had mental models. 
Especially for the two older age groups, correlations between the fragmented and 
observed distributions were strong (typically r > .9) and highly significant. The 
number of children who gave RCs that were consistent with the mental models 
described by Vosniadou and Brewer (1992, 1994) was very similar to that predicted 
by the fragmentation account, and considerably fewer than was predicted by the 
mental model account. The fragmentation account of children’s knowledge, then, 
explained almost all the variance in the children’s responses. If children have mental 
models, their influence on responses to our questions was negligible.
Vosniadou and her colleagues’ approach involves searching for mental models 
derived from their participants’ responses, and then classifying the same responses 
according to these mental models. With this post hoc, circular process there is a 
danger of ‘finding’ consistency – and therefore evidence of mental models – when in 
reality there is none. To illustrate this point, if the same approach were taken with the 
present data by defining mental models according to the six most commonly occurring 
RCs, it could be claimed that over three quarters (77%) of children had consistent 
mental models. This proportion would rise to 85% if we chose to look for eight mental 
models, and even higher if ‘acceptable deviations’ were introduced. These proportions 
are very similar to those reported by Vosniadou and her colleagues (e.g., Diakidoy et 
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al, 1997; Vosniadou and Brewer, 1992), according to whom six earth shape models 
accounted for over 80% of the participants’ responses. Yet our analyses show that 
these proportions are almost identical to those that would be expected by chance 
alone, i.e., if there were no consistency between children’s responses, as shown by the 
fragmented distribution. 
The distinction between knowledge (the awareness of certain facts) and 
understanding (the application of these facts in novel situations) is captured by 
Vosniadou and Brewer’s (1992) use of factual and generative questions [5]. They 
propose that factual questions elicit knowledge because they test children’s exposure 
to scientific facts but not their ability to use these facts. Generative questions, on the 
other hand, ask children to explain phenomena, predict events or reason about 
material which they cannot directly observe or have not been told about. Generative 
questions test understanding and hence provide information about possible underlying 
conceptual structures. 
Of our four questions, questions one and three could be argued to be factual 
questions, as they concern information that is likely to have been communicated by, 
for example, formal schooling. Questions two and four, however, are generative 
questions. It might be argued that the inconsistencies reported here result from the 
lack of association between knowledge and understanding rather than from the 
absence of mental models. However, the mental model account would still predict 
consistency between responses to the two generative questions. We looked for such 
consistency but found none. 
Another possible explanation of our findings of inconsistency is that our 
interviewees guessed their answers because of the forced choice nature of our 
questions. This would lead to random response combinations, and hence to any 
underlying coherence being concealed. Were this the case, children would be expected 
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to perform worse (i.e., give more incorrect answers) in our interviews than in 
Vosniadou and her colleagues’. But we found the opposite: even our 4-5 year-old 
interviewees showed knowledge and understanding of aspects of the earth that were 
apparent only in the responses of their older participants. Also, systematic omission of 
each of the four questions from the analysis resulted in little or no reduction in 
correlations between fragmented and observed RC distributions. This indicates that 
none of the four questions increased inconsistency.
The picture of knowledge acquisition that emerges from these findings is of a 
process of gradual accumulation, piece by piece, of loosely related fragments of 
cultural information. These are disorganised until the coherent scientific notion of the 
earth is gained. It remains for future research to establish whether this is also the case 
for knowledge acquisition in other domains. 
The finding that language ability is an important factor in children’s 
understanding of some aspects of the earth suggests that the transmission of this 
cultural information is likely to be principally linguistic. It may be the case that, 
although globes, photographs and other visual resources are important sources of 
information, understanding within this and other domains of scientific understanding 
is acquired primarily through conversations with adults, spoken classes given by 
teachers, and children’s own reading (Siegal, 1997, in press).
In summary, the data presented here indicate that children’s knowledge of the 
earth is fragmented. Fragments of knowledge appear to be acquired independently 
from one another, at different rates according to their content and to the linguistic 
ability of the child. It is likely that cultural transmission of some or all fragments is 
primarily linguistic, perhaps through conversations, schools and the media. There was 
no evidence that children’s responses to questions are guided by intuitions of flatness 
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or support. These findings are inconsistent with Vosniadou and Brewer’s (1992, 1994) 
claim that young children’s knowledge is organised into distinct mental models.
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Table 1: Percentage of responses to the four questions by children’s ethnicity and age. 
Ethnicity Gujarati (n = 82) White (n = 85) All (n = 167)
Age (years)
Response
4-5 6-7 8 All 4-5 6-7 8 All 4-5 6-7 8 All
Model chosen
Sphere 66.7 86.2 96.6 84.1 59.3 96.6 100 85.9 62.7 91.4 98.3 85.0
Flat-topped sphere 25.0 0 3.4 8.5 11.1 0 0 3.5 17.6 0 1.7 6.0
Disc 8.3 13.8 0 7.3 29.6 3.4 0 10.6 19.6 8.6 0 9.0
You can’t fall off the edge 65.2 48.3 57.1 56.3 70.4 75.9 82.8 76.5 68.0 62.1 70.2 66.7
People can live all over 54.2 69.0 82.8 69.5 51.9 69.0 96.6 72.9 52.9 69.0 89.7 71.3
The sky is all around 25.0 55.2 62.1 48.8 37.0 65.4 69.0 57.3 31.4 60.0 65.5 53.0
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Table 2: Mean (s.d.) number of questions answered correctly (maximum = 4), by age group (years) and ethnicity.
Ethnicity
Age group
Gujarati White Both
4-5 2.09 (0.97) 2.19 (0.74) 2.14 (0.85)
6-7 2.59 (0.87) 3.0 (0.93) 2.79 (0.91)
8 2.97 (1.05) 3.48 (0.69) 3.22 (0.92)
All 2.57 (1.02) 2.91 (0.95) 2.74 (0.99)
Understanding the earth    34
34
Table 3. Logistic regression models (using backwards LR) for each question with age, ethnicity and language comprehension
Question Age Ethnicity Vocabulary χ2 p Goodness of 
fit*
Model selection: sphere v other ü û ü 39.83 <0.0001 106.6
Fall off the world ü û ü 16.90 <0.0005 162.3
Live all over the world ü û û 20.90 <0.0001 163.6
Sky all around ü û û 14.89 <0.0005 164.6
N. B. üA tick indicates that the variable is included in the regression model
*-2 log likelihood
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Table 4. Associations between responses to pairs of questions, by age group and ethnicity. 
Ethnicity Gujarati White Both
Age
Response
All 4-5 6-7 8 All
Sphere chosen – can’t fall off n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Sphere chosen – live all over n.s. ** n.s. n.s. ** **
Sphere chosen – sky all around n.s. n.s. + n.s. n.s. n.s.
Can’t fall off – live all over n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Can’t fall off – sky all around * n.s. n.s. n.s. ** **
Live all over – sky all around n.s. n.s. ** n.s. + n.s.
+ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01
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Table 5. Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) between observed and fragmented RC distributions for each set of 3 or 4 questions.
Questions 1,2 & 3 Questions 1,2 & 4 Questions 1,3 & 4 Questions 2,3 & 4 All 4 questions
Age Ethnicity N r p r p r p r p r p
4 – 5 years Gujarati 24 .95 <.001 .87 <.001 .90 <.001 .74 .04 .77 <.001
White 27 .83 <.001 .82 <.001 .69 .01 .73 .04 .67 <.001
Both 51 .91 <.001 .93 <.001 .82 <.001 .80 .02 .79 <.001
6 – 7 years Gujarati 29 .98 <.001 .96 <.001 .98 <.001 .74 .03 .91 <.001
White 29 1.0 <.001 .99 <.001 1.0 <.001 .98 <.001 .99 <.001
Both 58 1.0 <.001 .98 <.001 1.0 <.001 .89 .003 .96 <.001
8 years Gujarati 29 .99 <.001 .92 <.001 .98 <.001 .88 <.001 .92 <.001
White 29 1.0 <.001 .99 <.001 1.0 <.001 .99 <.001 .99 <.001
Both 58 1.0 <.001 .96 <.001 1.0 <.001 .96 <.001 .97 <.001
All Gujarati 82 .99 <.001 .94 <.001 .99 <.001 .84 .009 .94 <.001
White 85 .98 <.001 .99 <.001 .99 <.001 .97 <.001 .97 <.001
Both 167 .99 <.001 .97 <.001 .99 <.001 .93 .001 .96 <.001
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Figure 1: Response combination distributions of age and ethnic groups
(NB. Each child's combination of responses to the four questions is his or her 
'response combination'. The 'fragmented' distribution is the distribution of these 
response combinations by a group of children that would be expected if these 
responses lacked any coherence.)
Fig 1a. Response combination distribution for 4-5 year-olds
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Fig 1b. Response combination distribution for 6-7 year-olds
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Fig 1c. Response combination distribution for 8 year-olds
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Fig 1d. Response combination distribution for Gujarati children
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Fig 1e. Response combination distribution for white children
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Fig 1f. Response combination distribution for all children
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Footnotes
1. Gujarat is a state in western India. ‘White’ refers here to people of European 
origin.
2. Butterworth et al (2001) found that exchanging the potentially ambiguous word 
“earth” with “world” made no difference to children’s responses.
3. Vosniadou and her colleagues have used repeated and similar questions in their 
interviews. This approach was avoided here because, as Siegal (1999) and Siegal, 
Waters and Dinwiddy (1988) have argued, if a question is asked more than once 
there is a danger that children will assume that their first answer must have been 
incorrect. Children will then strive to provide alternative answers in the hope that 
they will hit upon the 'right' one, or in an attempt to provide an account that, 
although misconceived, is coherent.
4. Except insofar as questions are of similar difficulty: a child who answered one 
question correctly is likely to answer another equally hard question correctly, and 
vice versa.
5. The distinctions between ‘knowledge’, ‘understanding’ and ‘guessing’ have been 
explored in a follow-up study in which children were asked to explain and justify 
their responses to the questions (Martin, Clifford, et al, 2001).
